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Case Comments
Intestate Succession: Child Inherits From Stepparent
The decedent died intestate, his wife having predeceased
him. He was survived by a stepdaughter, two brothers, and
several nephews and nieces. Upon appointment of one of the
nephews as administrator, the stepdaughter cross-petitioned,

seeking revocation of the letters of administration and requesting
that she be appointed administratrix. The court, ruling on the
nephew's motion to dismiss the cross-petition, asserted that determination of the motion was dependent upon whether the step2
daughter was entitled to inherit' in preference to the other heirs.

In a decision based on a provision of the District of Columbia
Code which asserts that "there is no distinction between the kindred of the whole and the half-blood . . ." the court denied the
motion to dismiss the cross-petition, holding a stepchild is entitled to inherit from his stepparent under the intestate succession laws as if he were a natural child. In re Estate of Humphrey, 254 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1966).
At common law only kin of the whole blood were entitled to
inherit real property. If there were no living kin of the whole
blood, a decedent's realty would escheat to the lord.3 Since one
who was related to the decedent by the half blood could not
inherit realty from him,4 it follows that stepchildren were also
excluded. However, half blood statutes have been enacted in
most jurisdictions 5 to eliminate the injustices which arise under
1. The court apparently felt there was no issue of equitable or
virtual adoption of the stepdaughter. This doctrine has sometimes been
used to grant rights of inheritance to stepchildren and foster children
in cases where hardship might otherwise result. See generally 50 MnN.
L. REV. 499 (1966).
2. It is not clear how the court reached this conclusion. A provision
of the District of Columbia Code enumerates the persons who are eligible
to administer the estate of an intestate decedent in the order in which
they are to be preferred. D.C. CODE .Aw. § 20-334 (Supp. V, 1966).
This statute provides that spouses and children are to be preferred to
all others. The court apparently felt that if the stepdaughter was to
be treated as a natural child for the purposes of inheritance, she could
be treated as such for the purpose of granting letters of administration.
3. 2 PoLLocK & MAITLA&Im, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 302

(2d ed. 1911).

4.
of 1670
equally
Crooke,
LAW

In the case of personalty, however, the Statute of Distributions
was construed to permit relatives of the half blood to share
with those of the whole blood of the same degree. Watts v.
2 Vern. 124, 23 Eng. Rep. 689 (1690). See generally ATKMsON,
OF WILLs § 8 (2d ed. 1953).
5. ATmINsoN, op. cit. supra note 4. at 74.
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the common law rule. 6 These statutes give relatives of the half
blood rights of inheritance which, with various exceptions in
different jurisdictions, 7 are on a par with those given to relatives
of the whole blood.8 However, stepchildren have not fallen
within the terms of any of those statutes, since they are not
even relatives of the deceased by the half blood.9
Although the laws of descent and distribution have generally followed lines of blood relationship,10 there have been exceptions. In most United States jurisdictions adopted children
6. For example, a man leaves a son and daughter by a first wife,
and a son by a second wife. His eldest son inherits and is entitled to
seisin. However, if that son dies without issue before he has obtained
seisin, his father is still the propositus-the one from whom the relationships are to be measured. The father now has a daughter by his first
marriage and a son by the second. The son inherits before the daughter
due to the common law rule of primogeniture. (Under modern law,
however, the son and daughter would share equally.) He inherits from
the father, not his half brother. On the other hand, if the elder son
acquires seisin, all is altered. If he dies without issue, he is the propositus. The choice is now between a sister by the whole blood and a half
brother. In this situation, not merely is the sister to be preferred, but
the land shall sooner escheat to the lord than go to the half brother.
2 POLLOcK & MAITLAmN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 302.
7. Statutes in a number of states place relatives of the half blood
in a position of equality with those of the whole blood. E.g., ILL. AwN.
STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965). Others qualify this position
of equality when the property in question has descended from an ancestor whose kin of the half blood are not of his blood. E.g., MN=. STAT.
§ 525.17 (1965). Other statutory schemes give twice as much to relatives
of the whole blood as to those of the half blood. E.g., Axm. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14-210 (1956). Some postpone the rights of the half blood to
those of the whole blood. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-276 (1958).
And some give preference to siblings of the whole blood and their representatives, over siblings of the halfblood and their representatives, but
provide for equality beyond the level of siblings. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-52 (1962). See generally Atkinson, Succession Among Collaterals,
20 IOWA L. REV. 185, 197-202 (1935); Note, "42 YALE L.J. 101, 104-06
(1933).
8. In the example presented in note 6 supra, most jurisdictions
would now allow the half brother to inherit equally with the whole
blooded sister. See, e.g., statutes cited note 7 supra.
9. See, e.g., Houston v. McKinney, 54 Fla. 600, 45 So. 480 (1907);
In re Marquet's Will, 13 Misc. 2d 958, 178 N.Y.S.2d 783; Annot., 63 A.L.R.
2d 303 (1959).
10. An example of blood relationship which at common law did
not carry with it the right of inheritance is in the area of illegitimacy.
However, statutes in most American jurisdictions now make an illegitimate child an heir of the mother, and a majority make such a child an
heir of the mother's kindred. In addition, a few jurisdictions allow him
to inherit from the father if the biological parental relationship has been
established or if the father has acknowledged the child to be his. See
ATKiNSoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 81-83; MADDEN, PERsONs AND DOMESTIc
RELATIONS 352-53 (1931).
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have been given many of the rights of inheritance enjoyed by
natural children. 1 Similarly, statutes in several jurisdictions
confer limited rights of inheritance on stepchildren in specifically
designated situations. 12 For example, if property has come to a
person's stepparent from his natural parent, especially as community property, 13 or if there is no spouse, child, or other next of
14
kin surviving the deceased, he inherits from his stepparent.
Beyond these few situations, however, stepchildren have not
been able to inherit under statutes of intestate succession. Although a number of attempts have been made to extend rights
of inheritance to stepchildren by means of arguments based on
half blood statutes, the courts have uniformly held them inapplicable since stepchildren are blood strangers rather than half
bloods.' 5
The court in the instant case recognized that a stepchild is
neither of the whole nor of the half blood, but argued that to
confine the statute of intestate succession to collaterals inheriting from each other 16 would be to place a more restricted interpretation upon the statutes than is warranted by their lan7
guage.'
The court applied the statutes to the relationship between
collaterals when they inherit from someone else. For example,
11. See generally Note, 25 BROOKLYN L. REV. 231 (1959) (chart
showing rights of parties to adoption).
12. See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 303, 304-07 (1959).
13. See, e.g., CAL.. PROB. CODE § 228; OHio Ra. CODE ANN. § 2105.10
(Page 1953). See generally Amnot., 49 A.L.R.2d 391 (1956) (concerning
relatives by affinity).
14. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.23(7) (1949); Omio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.06 (Page 1953). See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 303, 304-07
(1959).
15. E.g., In re Wall's Will, 216 N.C. 805, 5 S.E.2d 837 (1939); In
the Matter of Smith's Estate, 49 Wash. 2d 229, 299 P.2d 550 (1956); cf.
In re Paus' Estate, 324 Ill. App. 58, 57 I\.E,2d 212 (1944).
16. In the area of intestate succession the term "half blood" refers
to the relationship between the heir and the deceased. In re Long's
Estate, 180 Okla. 28, 67 P.2d 41 (1936). See generally Annot., 110 A.L.R.
1014 (1937). Thus, when collateral relations inherit from each other,
half blood statutes require that those related to the deceased by the half
blood be treated equally with those related by the whole blood.
17. The section of the District of Columbia Code which specifically
deals with issuance of letters of administration contains a command that
"relations of the whole blood shall be preferred to those of the halfblood in the equal degree . .. ." D.C. CODE AmT. § 20-334a(6) (Supp.
V, 1966). Since the instant case arose over a controversy pertaining to
issuance of letters of administration, it could be argued that the above
provision is more appropriate to the issue of inheritance than that relied
upon by the court.

19661

CASE COMMENTS

a woman has two children by a prior marriage and one by her
present husband. In the past, half blood statutes have been applied in the situation where one of these children dies, requiring
that his half and whole blooded siblings share equal rights of
inheritance from him. However, the court applied the statute
to a different situation, holding that when the second husband
dies, all of the wife's children share equally, even though some
are not related by blood to the deceased. The court, focusing on
the relationship between the children rather than on the relationship between each child and the deceased parent, stated that
siblings of the half blood were to be treated as if they were siblings of the whole blood. Since siblings of the whole blood are
entitled to share equally in the estate of an intestate parent, the
court reasoned that siblings of the half blood are similarly entitled.
A basic difficulty arises when a statute which abrogates the
distinction between whole and half blood relationships is applied
in such a manner as to give a right of inheritance to a blood
stranger. The difficulty is not overcome merely by stating that
the statute is to be broadly construed, since such a statute is
not intended to create a new class of heirs unrelated by blood
to the deceased.'
Thus, other jurisdictions have interpreted
their half blood statutes as curative of the common law exclusion of half blood collateral relatives, but have refused to use
them to create rights of inheritance in stepchildren. 19 Moreover, Congress had no apparent intent to depart from this
interpretation, since the provision was introduced as being in
'20
the "form of a uniform law.
Instead of straining its interpretation of the half blood statute, the court could have argued that the term "child" includes
stepchildren within its meaning. The main difficulty with this
approach is that the term "children" is generally used to refer to
immediate progeny or offspring.2 1 Moreover, since Congress for
some purposes has explicitly stated that stepchildren should be
included within the term "children," 22 and because stepchildren
are not mentioned in the statute in question, it is arguable that
18. In re Paus' Estate, 324 Ill. App. 58, 57 N.E.2d 212 (1944).
19. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
20. 103 CONG. REC. 14227 (1957) (remarks of Senator Clark).
21. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beebe, 57 F. Supp. 754, 757 (D. Md.
1944) (parentage-first generation of offspring); Houston v. McKinney,
54 Fla. 600, 45 So. 480 (1907) (offspring-cannot include stepchildren).
22. Several examples are mentioned in the opinion of the court.
254 F. Supp. 33, 35 (1966). See generally note 27 infra.
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Congress intended to exclude them, or at least that the rights
of stepchildren were not considered.
Aside from the difficulties inherent in the approach taken
by the instant case, two basic questions remain to be answered.
It must be determined whether stepchildren should, in fact, inherit from intestate stepparents; and, if so, whether a court is
the proper body to provide that right.
To determine whether a stepchild should inherit, it is necessary to examine the purposes of the laws of intestate succession.
Basically, these laws are intended to fulfill the probable intent
of the deceased and to pursue certain goals of public policy. It
would be difficult to determine whether a stepparent would be
more likely than not to intend his stepchild to inherit. In many
instances, since a stepchild is a minor who is raised by his stepparent, there is a likelihood of mutual affection. Just as often,
however, a couple may marry when children of their prior marriages are fully grown and independent. It must also be recognized that if stepchildren are included in the class of heirs, others
obviously will be excluded. It therefore becomes even more
difficult to make this determination for the deceased. Similarly,
there are competing considerations with respect to social policies
pursued by the statutes. In some instances a stepchild's future
23
may depend upon financial assistance from his stepparent.
Society's interest in providing a substitute for such obligations
assumed by a deceased stepparent when he was living may dictate a conclusion that a stepchild shall inherit from his stepparent. However, this again is not always the case. Thus, these
considerations afford no definite indication whether stepchildren
24
should inherit from stepparents in all cases or in none.
23. See Lewis & Levy, Family Law & Welfare Policies: The Case
CALir. L. REV. 748, 763 (1966).
24. Sociological data seem to demonstrate that the conclusion is
sound. For example, in 1948 50% of divorced males remarried after age
56, and 50% of divorced females remarried after age 50. Regarding
widowed spouses, 50% of the males remarried after age 54 and 50% of
the females after age 40. See JACOBsoN, A EmcA MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE
83 (1959). Since the stepchild-stepparent relationship is a result of
remarriage, assuming that generally the ages of children are directly
related to the ages of their parents, these figures demonstrate that stepchildren are not more likely to fall into one particular age bracket than
another. Attempts have been made in areas other than inheritance to
here provide criteria by which it may be determined whether stepchildren (or children) should benefit from statutory schemes. E.g., the term
" 'child! shall include ... a stepchild ... who . . . [is] under eighteen
years of age, and also persons who, though eighteen years of age or over,
are wholly dependent upon the deceased employee ...." 52 Stat. 1164
(1938), 33 U.S.C. § 902 (14) (1964) (Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'

for "Dual Systems," 54

1966]

CASE COMMENTS

Since no definite answer can be ascertained from the purposes of intestate succession laws, it is necessary to consider the
effects of inclusion or exclusion from the class of heirs. Assuming a stepchild is to inherit from his stepparent, should he inherit through his stepparent? It could be argued that the stepparent is forcing an heir upon his relatives. However, this does
not seem to be forcing an heir any more than when natural
children are born. More important, it is less a question of forcing an heir than of undertaking the difficult task of determining the stepparent's probable intent. Similarly, if a stepchild is to inherit from his stepparent, should he also inherit
from or through his natural parent in whose place the stepparent stands? In the area of adoption, all ties between
natural parents and an adopted child are generally terminated
by statute. 25 However, since a stepchild's natural parents may
still have parental rights, complete severance is less justifiable
in this situation. If the right to inherit from a natural parent
is not terminated, a stepchild will be in a position to inherit from
two families. It could be argued that such dual inheritance is
inequitable. There is also a question whether a subsequent divorce of a natural parent and stepparent should operate to
terminate a child's right to inherit from his stepparent and/or
to reinstate his right to inherit from his other natural parent if
that right has been terminated. Itcan be argued that the right
to inherit from the stepparent should terminate because the relationship out of which it arose has been severed. If this is
done, it is necessary to face the problem of reinstating the right
to inherit from the other natural parent. The confusion which
will be created both in the law and for the individuals involved
suggests that divorce should not alter a stepchild's right to inherit from his stepparent. Finally, if a stepparent leaves a will
Compensation Act); "The term 'child! ... shall mean an unmarried
child, including... a stepchild . .. who received more than one-half
his support from and lived with the Member or employee in a regular
parent-child relationship, under the age of eighteen years .... ." 70
Stat. 743 § 1(j) (1956), 5 U.S.C. § 2251 (j) (1964) (Civil Service Retirement Act); "a stepchild or stepchildren shall be regarded the same as
issue of the body only when the stepparent has actually provided the
principal support for such child or children." IOWA CODE AWx.§ 85.42
(1959) (Workmen's Compensation Act); "member of the family of a
deceased employee . . .and dependent upon him for support." MLWN.
STAT. § 176.011(2) (1965)
(Workmen's Compensation Act). Perhaps
criteria could be provided along these lines to determine whether stepchildren should be able to inherit in a particular situation.
25. See generally Note, 42 B.U.L. REv. 210 (1962); Note, 16 N.Y.U.
IN-rRA L. Ra. 223 (1961); Comment, 24 GA. B.J. 139 (1962).
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which does not mention his stepchild, and the governing jurisdiction has a pretermitted heir statute protecting omitted children, it must be determined whether the stepchild should be
included within the statute's protection. Since the instant case
apparently treated the stepchild as a natural child, it would
seem that he should be included. However, since a stepparent's
intention to include his stepchild is less clear than is a natural
parent's intention to include his natural child, the inference provided by the stepchild's omission may lead to the opposite conclusion. In addition, the sense of justice which is embodied in
the preternitted heir statutes in the case of natural children
may not seem as strong when dealing with a stepchild.
The problems involved in giving stepchildren the right to
inherit from stepparents indicate that doing so may create a
great amount of uncertainty which must be eliminated if laws of
26
intestate succession are to be predictable in their application.
Predictability may be accomplished by either excluding stepchildren completely, as is presently done in most jurisdictions, or
by providing a comprehensive scheme in an attempt to solve
these problems. The apparent hardship which arises when a
stepchild cannot inherit from his stepparent is not as great a
consideration as it might at first appear, since such a child will
still have the right to inherit from both of his natural parents.
Further, if a stepparent intends to provide for his stepchild upon
his death he has the alternatives of adoption or inclusion in a
will. In cases of serious hardship a court can always make provision for a stepchild by means of the doctrine of equitable adoption 27 or some similar fiction. Therefore, granting the right of
inheritance to stepchildren is not as necessary as it might seem,
and in view of the uncertainties which are inherent in doing so,
it is better not to so extend this right.
However, the law in the District of Columbia following Humphrey is that a stepchild has the right to inherit from his stepparent. The court's decision leaves open all of the problems
discussed above. Moreover, the judiciary is not the proper body
to undertake to provide the comprehensive scheme required.
Since such a scheme could develop only on a case by case basis,
it would require many years to re-establish predictability in the
law of intestate succession. Therefore, if stepchildren should to
any extent inherit from their stepparents, the necessary guidelines can be provided only by the legislature.

26. Such uncertainty often arises with respect to adopted children,
whose rights have been fixed by statute in most jurisdictions. See ibid.
27. See 50 MmN. L. REv. 499 (1966).
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Labor Law: Charging Party's Right to
Hearing After Issuance of Complaint
Petitioner filed charges with the National Labor Relations
Board, alleging the union with which petitioner bargained collectively had committed unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act. A complaint was issued, and a date
for hearing was set. After an indefinite postponement of the
hearing, the Regional Director and the union entered into an
informal settlement agreement which stipulated that approval of
the agreement by the Regional Director would constitute withdrawal of the complaint.' Petitioner filed formal objections to
the settlement with the Regional Director and requested a hearing on the complaint. The latter's dismissal of the objections
and denial of the request for hearing were affirmed by the
General Counsel. Petitioner's subsequent request for review of
this action by the court of appeals was opposed by the Board
for lack of jurisdiction.2 The court reversed the determinations
of the General Counsel, holding it had jurisdiction over the
matter and that petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on its objections to the settlement agreement. Leeds &
Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966).
The position and rights of the charging party in unfair labor
practice proceedings 3 before the NLRB have never been clearly
1. The NLRB rules and regulations provide for withdrawal of a
complaint by the Regional Director on his own motion prior to a hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 102.18 (1966).
2. The Board contended that since no order of the Board had been
issued, there was no final action by the Board subject to review under
the statute. See National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited NLRA],
§ 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964);
Brief for Respondents, pp. 6-7.
3. The basic procedure of the NLRB in an unfair labor practice
case is as follows. Charges are filed by an interested party and investigated by a Regional Director as agent for the General Counsel. On
the basis of this investigation the charges are dismissed, or a formal
complaint with notice of a hearing is issued. If the charges are dismissed, the charging party may appeal to the General Counsel, whose
review is final. If a complaint is issued, the charged party files an answer, and an evidentiary hearing is held before a trial examiner. The
record of the hearing and the examiner's own report are filed with the
Board, which reviews both and issues a final order. The order is appealable to the courts of appeals, and the Board may apply to the courts
for an enforcement decree. At any time prior to the hearing, however,
the Regional Director may work out a settlement with the parties. This
settlement may be formal, calling for approval by the Board, or informal, resulting in a withdrawal of the complaint, as in the instant case.
See 29 C.F.R. § 101.2-.15 (1966).
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defined.4 The NLRA covers specifically only the rights of the
charged party,5 while the rights of the charging party have been
left to judicial interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
NLRA 6 and the Administrative Procedure Act.7 Once a final
order of the Board has been entered contrary to the interests of
the charging party, it is then a "person aggrieved" within section 10(f) of the NLRA and is entitled to judicial review of
the Board's order.8 However, a refusal by the General Counsel
to issue a complaint based upon the charges filed is within his
sole discretion, thus not reviewable either by the Board or the
courts.9 It is between these extremes that the law is uncertain,
and the courts are sharply divided.
The Third Circuit established, in Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 10 that the charging party is entitled to a
hearing on its objections to a consent order entered by the Board,
pursuant to a settlement worked out between the Regional Director and the charged party. The facts of Marine Engineers'
differed from those of the instant case only in that a formal
consent order was issued by the Board in the former, while the
Regional Director simply withdrew the complaint as part of an
informal settlement agreement in the latter. The opinion in
Marine Engineers' laid no stress upon the consent order; rather,
4. For a detailed discussion of the law in this area, see Note, 32
U. Cmr. L. RV. 786 (1965).
5. See NLRA § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1964).
6. NLRA § 3(d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153
(d) (1964), establishes a General Counsel and grants him sole authority
to investigate charges, issue complaints, and prosecute the complaints
issued. NLRA § 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160
(f) (1964), grants appellate review for: "Any person aggrieved by a
final order of the Board granting or denying ...

the relief sought ....

"

7. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1964), [hereinafter
cited as APA]. APA § 5(b), 60 Stat. 239-40 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(b)
(1964), provides in part: "The agency shall afford all interested parties ...

(2)

to the extent that the parties are unable to determine

any controversy by consent, hearing, and decision upon notice .... "
Section 10(c), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1964), states:
"[E]very final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy shall be subject to judicial review."
8. Note 6 supra; see, e.g., Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205
(1965); American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100
(1953); Insurance Workers Union v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
9. NLRA § 3(d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153
(d) (1964); e.g., NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357
U.S. 10 (1958); Anthony v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1953); General
Drivers Union v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1950).
10. 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
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it appeared to consider the fact that a complaint was issued to
be of primary importance. Thus, the court stated:
Our best judgment is that the charging party, after the complaint is issued, does have some standing. The Board may refuse to do anything ....
But . . . once it goes to the extent
of filing a complaint, then we think that he is entitled to have
a chance to be heard ....
1
However, seven years later in Insurance Workers v. NLRB,' 2 on
facts virtually identical to those of the instant case, the same
court, per curiam, denied a petition for review on the ground it
lacked jurisdiction. But in a later case that year the court
quoted with approval from the language of Marine Engineers'
referred to above. 13 Thus, contrary to the lack of emphasis upon
the consent order in the Marine Engineers' opinion, the entire
sequence of decisions suggests that jurisdiction was dependent
upon this factor. Since the approach of Marine Engineers' was
later affirmed, the decision in Insurance Workers can be distinguished only on the absence of a formal disposition by consent order in the latter.
In 1961 the District of Columbia Circuit, in Textile Workers
v. NLRB,14 on facts similar to Marine Engineers', adopted a
rule requiring the NLRB either to grant the charging party an
opportunity to be heard or to enter into the record a detailed
statement of its basis for accepting the settlement despite the
charging party's objections.15 In 1964, however, the Second Circuit in Local 282, Teamsters Union v. NLRB,' 6 held on facts
similar to Marine Engineers' and Textile Workers that a charg11. Id. at 549.
12. 46 L.R.R.M. 2028 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 806 (1960).
13. Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 575, 588-89 (3d Cir.
1960).
14. 294 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
15. The rationale in establishing these alternatives appears to be
that since the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the Board's
consent orders, the record necessary for such review can be provided
equally well by either an evidentiary hearing or a detailed statement
of the Board's reasons for its decision. On remand, the Board entered
a statement of its reasons into the record, and on the second appeal the
order was affirmed. 315 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The original opinion
of the court has been strongly criticized for its failure to deal with section
5(b) of the APA. Note, 32 U. Cni. L. R.v. 786, 792 (1965).
A district court, however, has ruled that where an informal settlement agreement is attempted by the General Counsel, the charging
party is entitled to be heard on its objections to the settlement. Local
112, Int'l Union Allied Industrial Workers v. Rothman, 209 F. Supp. 295
(D.D.C. 1962). Textile Workers was distinguished on the dubious ground
that it involved formal Board action.
16. 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964).
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ing party who objects to a settlement worked out between the
Regional Director and the charged party has no right to a hearing. The Board in Teamsters had complied with the requirement
of Textile Workers by filing a supplementary statement setting
17
out its reasons for denying the objections to the settlement.
Since the court chose to decide only whether or not there should
have been a hearing,' 8 however, the substance of the Board's
order was not in issue, and the sufficiency of the Board's method
of stating its reasons was considered only secondarily.
The reason the Second and Third Circuits reached opposite
conclusions regarding the same legislation lies in the different
premises from which they reasoned. The Second Circuit based
its interpretation of the statutes on its conceptions of the NLRB
as an agency established to protect public rights and interests,
and of the NLRA as granting no private rights. 19 To adopt this
position the court was forced to resort to what even it admitted "
was a strained interpretation of section 5(b) of the APA. It
declared that the "interested parties" entitled to a hearing within
from a
the meaning of that section were to be distinguished
"person . . .adversely affected or aggrieved" 21 or "aggrieved"2 2
by final order of an agency entitled to judicial review under
other sections of the APA or under the NLRA. "Interested parties" were held to be only those having some legally recognized
private interest.2 3 Since the court was satisfied that the NLRA
17. Id. at 798.
18. What course the Second Circuit would take if an appeal were

taken solely upon the sufficiency of the reasons given for denying objections to a settlement is purely speculative. Since the court has determined that a charging party has no right to a hearing under these circumstances, the choices open to it would be: to accept the reasons given;
remand for a clearer statement or further proceedings at the Board's
discretion; overturn the Board's order; or broaden the area of administrative discretion by not requiring the Board to make any statement
of its reasons for disregarding the objections.
19. As the primary authority for this position, the court relied upon
Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261
(1940). The language of the Court there indicated that the Board acts
only on behalf of the public, and that "no private right of action is contemplated" by the NLRA. Id. at 267 n.9.
20. In Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, at 800 (2d Cir. 1964),
the court stated: "The distinction admittedly is easier to state than to
apply."
21. APA § 10(a), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
"Any person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by . . . [any agency]

. . . action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled
to judicial review thereof."
22. NLRA § 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
160 (f) (1964).
23. Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1964).
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created no private rights of action, it was able to conclude that
section 5 (b) of the APA was inapplicable.
Although the Third Circuit stated that it recognized the
Board's function is to represent the public interest, it found
that "this is one of those situations where general propositions
do not decide concrete cases.1 24 It considered Amalgamated Util.
Workers only in passing, 25 without referring to the language of
that case upon which the Teamsters court relied to deny the existence of private rights under the NLRA. Relying instead upon
section 5(b) of the APA, which had been distinguished by the
Second Circuit, and upon the NLRB rules and regulations establishing the charging party to the Board's hearings, 26 the court
concluded that the NLRA was intended to protect private as well
when a
as public rights and that a hearing must be granted
27
charging party objects to the settlement agreement.
In deciding the question of jurisdiction, the court in the
instant case was faced with its previous decision in Insurance
Workers, and with the problem of interpreting the terms "final
order" in section 10(f) of the NLRA,2 8 and "final" in the review
provisions of the APA.29 The court bypassed the numerous attempts made by other courts to establish what is meant by final
order of the Board.30 Instead it relied upon the test of reviewability stated by the Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. United States:31 "The ultimate test of reviewability
is not to be found in an overrefined technique, but in the need
of the review to protect from the irreparable injury threatened
in the exceptional case by administrative rulings ....
,,32 and
24. Marine Engineers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 547 (3d Cir.
1953).
25. Id. at 548.
26. 29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1966).
27. Marine Engineers' Ass'n. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 547-50 (3d Cir,
1953). The positions adopted by the two circuits are discussed at length
in connection with § 10 of the APA, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009
(1964), in a series of articles by Raoul Berger and Kenneth Culp Davis,
beginning with Berger, Administrative Arbitrarinessand JudicialReview,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965), followed by DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW
TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965), and concluding with a series of short
alternating articles by each of the two men in 114 U. PA. L. REv. 783-833
(1966).
28. 61 Stat. 148 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964).
29. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1964).
30. E.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S.
511 (1955); Manhattan Const. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1952);
Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1948); Thompson Prods., Inc.
v. NLRB, 133 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1943).
31. 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942) (involving the FCC).
32. Ibid.
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upon section 10(c) of the APA,33 which the court contended
was intended for situations where adequate judicial review has
not been provided. 34 In answering the Board's jurisdictional
argument that there had been no final order of the Board, and
therefore no right to judicial review under the NLRA, 35 the
court noted the only reason there was no Board order was that
the Regional Director chose to enter into an informal rather than
a formal settlement. Had there been a formal settlement, under
Marine Engineers' jurisdiction would clearly have been obtained
because of the resulting consent order issued by the Board.
Therefore, if the court were to hold it lacked jurisdiction in this
case, the right of a charging party to judicial review of the
Board's refusal to conduct a hearing would depend upon a discretionary choice of procedural methods by the Regional Director.
This the court concluded could not have been the intent of Congress in adopting the NLRA, and therefore the formal-informal
distinction could not be determinative.3 6 The court concluded
that while there was no final action of the Board within the
terms contemplated by the NLRA, the action taken by the Regional Director was final agency action within the terms of the
APA under the Columbia Broadcastingtest, since it operated as
a final determination upon the charging party. Therefore, jurisdiction was found to lie within the terms of section 10(c) of the
APA.37 Apparently with reference to future cases, the court
then stated that where consent of all the parties to an informal
settlement cannot be reached, the Board action must be formal38
ized to present a record for judicial review.
The determination that the Board's action must be formalized
presented the basic issue: whether that formalization must take
the form of a hearing on the charging party's objections to the
settlement. In deciding this question, the court gave much
weight to Local 283, UAW v. Scofield,39 in which the Supreme
33. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1964).
34. 357 F.2d at 532.
35. See note 2 supra.
36. 357 F.2d at 531-33.
37. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § :1009(c) (1964).
38. 357 F.2d at 533.
39. 382 U.S. 205 (1965). It was held that the party in whose favor
the Board rules can intervene as. of right if the losing party appeals the
Board's final order to a court of appeals. Scofield, which involved intervention by the charged party, was consolidated on certiorari with
Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1964), which presented
the reverse situation. The courts of appeals in both cases held that there
was no right to intervene. Fafnir,decided by the same court that decided
Teamsters, was based on the public-private interest concept in reliance
upon Amalgamated Util. Workers.
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Court stated regarding public and private interests: "[W] e think
that the statutory pattern of the Labor Act does not dichotomize
'public' as opposed to 'private' interests. Rather the two interblend in the intricate statutory scheme." 40 The Court further
stated that it did not believe its holding in Amalgamated UtiL.
Workers cast any doubt upon the interblending of these interests.4 1 This reasoning appears to be a clear rejection of the
42
basis for the Second Circuit's position as stated in Teamsters
and an indication the court is willing to follow the line of reasoning adopted by Marine Engineers'.
Relying on the Scofield case, the Third Circuit questioned
the validity of the delegation to the Regional Director of the
authority to withdraw complaints on his own motion. The Board
argued that the Regional Director acts in this regard as an
agent for the General Counsel to whom Congress has granted
discretionary power to control prosecution of complaints. 43 This
power would be meaningless, according to the Board, if the Regional Director could not determine whether to continue or drop
their prosecution. 44 The court, however, refused to accept this
interpretation of the statute. It determined that the withdrawal
of the complaint was an adjudicatory action not within the discretionary area granted to the General Counsel by the NLRA.
Therefore, the Regional Director must have been acting as an
agent of the Board. The court found such delegation of the
Board's final authority to adjudicate a complaint to a subordinate official to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme of the
45
NLRA and contrary to law.
This conclusion strongly appears to have been motivated by
the court's concern about the effects acceptance of the Board's
argument would have upon the charging party. The general
40. 382 U.S. at 220.
41. Ibid. The holding in Amalgamated Util. Workers, 309 U.S. 261
(1940), that the successful party before the NLRB cannot apply to a
court of appeals to have the losing party judged in contempt for its failure to obey a decree enforcing the Board's order, is compatible with an
interblending of public and private interests. However, there is language in that case to the contrary. See note 19 supra. Further, the
Second Circuit was not alone in its belief as to the significance of Amalgamated UtiL. Workers. See, e.g., Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in
Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. REv. 720, 726-30 (1946); Note, 32 U. CmR.
L. REV. 786, 794 n.48 (1965).
42. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
43. NLRA § 3(d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153
(d) (1964).
44. Brief for Respondents, pp. 7-10.
45. 357 F.2d at 535; cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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tenor of the opinion indicated that upon evidence of a violation
of the NLRA sufficient to warrant issuance of a complaint, the
injured private party should be granted an opportunity to prove
the violation and obtain redress therefor. Informal withdrawal
of the complaint without consent of the charging party, however, would give the Regional Director the power to make "factual findings without affording an opportunity to the aggrieved
charging party to prove or amplify its grievances .... ,"41 Moreover, in the absence of a right to appeal such an action, that
power would be absolute. Therefore, in view of the policy underlying the opinion, since these practices would deny redress for
colorable complaints, they should not be tolerated unless explicitly provided by the review provisions of the NLRA.
It appears that the court attempted to visualize and conform
to the statutory scheme interblending public and private interests
formulated by the Supreme Court in Scofield. It attempted to
avoid unreasonably infringing upon NLRB procedures designed
to expedite settlement of cases without infringing upon those
rights and interests of private parties protected by the NLRA.
In the extremely important area of unfair labor practices,
private rights of the parties are clearly affected by administrative and judicial determinations. 47 The public interest in efficient operation of the NLRB should be sufficiently protected by
the discretionary authority of the General Counsel to issue complaints 48 and the authority of the Board or its agents to negotiate settlements to which all parties agree. 49 Once a complaint
has been issued, if amicable settlement cannot be reached, protection of the private rights of the charging party demands a
hearing on the merits of the complaint. 50
46. 357 F.2d at 535-36.
47. Id. at 536.
48. See NLRA § 3(d), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (1964).
49. 29 C.F.R. g§ 101.7, 101.9 (1966).

50. The exact nature of the required hearing is not clear. From the
opinion in the instant case it could be either a hearing on the objections
to the settlement agreement before the Regional Director, possibly with
a line of appeal-through the General Counsel to the courts, or a hearing
before a trial examiner on the merits of the complaint, with appeals
going first to the Board and then to the courts. However, NLRB procedure, which at the time the instant case was decided only provided
for the latter type of hearing, has not been amended. See note 3 supra.
Thus, under the NLRB's interpretation of the instant case a full hearing
on the merits before a trial examiner would result from a charging
party's failure to agree to a settlement. While this forces a greater burden upon the Board because of an increased 'case load, it is to be preferred to the alternative procedure, which would create additional steps
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Since the court explicitly determined that the NLRB's informal withdrawal provision is contrary to law and is no longer
acceptable procedure, the instant case will undoubtedly affect
NLRB procedure. The number of hearings regarding charges
of unfair labor practices will probably increase, since objections
by charging parties will prevent informal withdrawal of complaints,r" and the assurance of obtaining hearings will probably
increase the number of objections to settlements. Further, at
least in the Third Circuit, the time between filing charges and
issuance of complaints will increase, since once issued, no complaint can be withdrawn without the consent of the charging
party. Eventually, however, the number of complaints issued
may decrease, due both to more extensive investigations and to
an increased need for the Board to minimize its work load by
issuing complaints only in clearly meritorious cases.
The instant case is a reversal of an appellate trend to broaden the area of administrative discretion within the structure of
the NLRB. The cumulative effects of Marine Engineers', Scofield, and the instant case, representing "expanding judicial concepts giving full range to the Labor Management Relations Act
and to fundamental due process, ''5 2 will probably influence the
views of other circuits not only upon the question of the rights
of charging parties in unfair labor practice proceedings, but also
regarding generally the permissible scope of administrative discretion entrusted to the NLRB.
The basic issues covered by the instant case are worthy of
determination by the Supreme Court. The conflict between
the Second and Third Circuits has not been resolved, and depending upon how Scofield affects the Second Circuit's position,
the instant case only serves to widen the breach between them.
The uncertainty of the law outside these circuits, due in part
to the conflict between them, hampers the efficient operation of
the NLRB. The Third Circuit appears to be correct in its interpretation of the NLRB and APA and of the reasoning of the
in the review process. Thus under that approach, before the courts
would be confronted with the first question presented under present
procedure-validity of the Board's determination on the merits-they
would first have to determine the validity of the General Counsel's disposition of the objections to a settlement agreement.
51. See Brief for Respondents, p. 10 n.12. Approximately 3800 complaints were settled or adjusted in 1965 (259 of the total cases closed),
although the Board's statistics gave no indication how many of these
settlements were over the objections of the charging party. 13 NLRB
ANN.REP. 9-10 (1965).
52. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 1966).
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Supreme Court. The alternative position adopted by the Second Circuit would appear in some measure to sacrifice a charging
party's right to relief from unfair labor practices to the desire
of the Board to dispose of cases as expeditiously as possible and
to the willingness of a charged party to bargain for some minor
punishment in return for a settlement prior to a formal hearing. 53
Until the question is settled by the Supreme Court, the NLRB
and the parties before it will remain uncertain as to the propriety of their actions and the extent of their rights.

53. Such an effect could result either from a charged party's offer
to the Board of an opportunity to avoid the time and expense of a hearing, administrative review, and possible appeal to the courts, or from the
Board's attempt to avoid these consequences by offering a settlement of
substantially less than maximum punishment. In either case the charging party would be denied an effective opportunity to obtain full redress,
since there would be no review of the denial of a hearing on the merits.

